[MUSIC] What do we mean with the term Arab exceptionalism that you have come across in the previous section? To understand that term, it is necessary to briefly examine what the general condition is from which the Arab experience is said to deviate. That general experience can be described as, the spread of the basic idea that the population should somehow be involved in decisions affecting its livelihood. This is by no means a modern idea. Nor does it necessarily include all the nice things often associated with the notion of democracy and modern discourse. Such as the rule of law, constitutionalism, etc. Looking at the past 200 years we can observe that this idea has spread consistently and globally, but not evenly. The late American political scientist, Samuel Huntington, describes this phenomena in his influential book. The Third Wave Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, as three consecutive waves. Each wave is defined as a group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time. And that significantly outnumber transitions in the the opposite direction during that period. For the purposes of this course, we do not need to concern ourselves with the inherent problems of classifying complex social processes. Into the somewhat simplistic binary of democratic versus nondemocratic. Just be aware that the issue is complex. Huntington proposes a purely procedural valuation. Namely the existence of free universal competitive elections. Accordingly, he defines a 20th century political system as democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections. In which the candidates freely compete for votes and in which all the virtually adult population is eligible to vote. You have probably already noticed that this is hardly a description anyone would apply to any Arab state. Huntington observes three periods in which large numbers of countries made that transition. Each followed by a reverse wave in which some democratic gains were lost again. The first, long wave of democratization occurred from 1828 till 1926. The second, short wave of democratization occurred from 1943 to 1962. And the third, current wave of democratization, began in 1974 and is ongoing. Each of these waves was followed by a reverse wave, where democratic gains were lost, as you can see on the screen. What drives now a nation towards democratic governments. The first wave was caused by the long term demonstration effect of the French and American revolutions. And the manner in which Republican ideas were received into the rest of European body politic. If interested, you can find more on this topic for instance, in Albert Hourani's classic book, Arab Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798 till 1939. Which discusses how these same ideas came to influence an important growing, but ultimately, still born Arab democratic movement. Looking at the long term institutional and ideational origins and effects of the European revolutionary project. I also refer you to an interesting recent comparison by two American academics. Steven Philip Kramer and Judith Yaphe, entitled The European Spring of 1848, and the Arab Spring of 2011 Lessons to be learned. They conclude, if 1848 proves anything, it is that the significance of great revolutionary upheavals emerges only slowly and long after the barricades have been torn down. It is clear that 1848 was not so much an end as a beginning. It is too early to tell how the Arab Spring will end. According to Huntington's reading of the historical record, the second wave of the democratization was caused by the demonstration effect of Allied success in World War II. Which led to a pervasive and lasting change in the intellectual environment of politics. People in most countries came to accept, if not to implement, the rhetoric and ideas of democracy. That is open, competitive participation in decision making. Importantly, the simultaneous ideological competition with communism reinforced the basic idea that it is the population that holds power. And that government should be for the benefit and with the participation of the common person. But the Arab world remained, by and large, under colonial domination well into the 1950s. And post-independence politics generally have been turbulent and violent. We can summarize the period immediately following colonial domination as the politics of family rule. As 21 Arab states or statelets has had as their head of state a king, amir, shaikh, sultan, bey or imam. Drawn from a family that had either established or been given hereditary right to rule. Five of these, Egypt, Tunisia, Iraq, Libya, and North Yemen, were deposed by military coup d'etats in the 1950s and 60s. Leaving 14 monarchies in the gulf, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman. And the seven members of the United Arab Emirates, plus Jordan and Morocco, to survive as monarchies to the present day. Lebanon achieved independence from a much weakened and itself occupied France in 1943 and Syria followed suit in 1946. In both countries post independence politics led to much turmoil and instability. Until a civil war and a military coup d'etat respectively ended electoral politics. Mauritania achieved independence from France in 1960 and immediately established a one-party dictatorship. The Comoros achieved independence in 1975 from France, and entered at least 30 years of political turmoil and violence. Djibouti achieved independence from France in 1977, and followed the same pattern. Somalia achieved independence from Britain in 1960, and by 1969, followed a coup d'etat, established the one party dictatorship. Which in 1991 collapsed into a bloody and ongoing civil war, making the country the quintessential failed state. These patterns are emblematic of the experience of much of the developing world. Where democracy has been slow to take root. Primarily because the social and economic mobilization caused by rapid modernization created expectations, dislocations and polarizations. That immature political institutions proved unable to contain or channel constructively. The fragility of the state machine and the instability of political life, created ample opportunities for determined men with a moustache, often with a military background. To take over fragile political and administrative systems and turn them into seemingly strong, repressive autocracies. We will return to the logic of the authoritarian bargain later. The still ongoing period of the third wave of democratization, began replacing autocracies with more inclusive rule bound polities. Beginning with the revolt by progressive Portuguese officers against one man rule in 1974. Huntington offer a particular causal explanation for the third wave, which has particular relevance for the Arab world. He argues that the primary driver towards electoral democracy is the inevitable decline in the legitimacy and governmental performance of authoritarian regimes. The inability of authoritarian regimes to respond effectively to the economic and debt crisis in the aftermath of the oil price shock of 1974. Began in this reading an enduring crisis of legitimacy, due to the outlying performance dilemma. That is the inability of any government, over time, to meet the expectations of the populations with respect to its ability to deliver service output. This very logic is very much epitomized in the problems faced by fascists Portugal, Spain, and Greece during the In the 1970s. Or communist Poland during the 1980s in keeping the lights on amidst crushing debt payments, unsustainable expenditure for military coercion and economic stagnation. These fiscal problems led eventually to the spread of more inclusive politics and more sensible economic policies throughout the third wave. And dramatically gathering momentum after the fall of communism in 1989. Ironically, it is these very factors that account for the relative resilience of the Arab authoritarian exception. The fiscal and trade hardships caused by the oil price shock of 1974, pushed many authoritarian regimes in other parts of the world over the edge economically. But simultaneously, these factors sheltered Arab regimes from popular pressure. As the rest of the world faced the reality check imposed on unpopular and unproductive regimes, aching under much higher energy bills. This very money was flowing to the Arab world and permitted a very peculiar social contract to take hold. [MUSIC]
