Hi there, welcome to the fifth week of this course. In the previous weeks, we have learned that terrorism can have a high impact on societies and that terrorism as a phenomenon cannot be defeated. We have also discussed various negative side effects of counterterrorism measures, such as profiling, decapitation of terrorist organizations, and the holistic or comprehensive approach of terrorism. In this week, we will focus on the impact of terrorism, and the side effects and unintended outcomes of counterterrorism on societies and on our daily lives. What have scholars said about these impacts and how can we limit the negative consequences? In this video, we discuss the negative side effects of fear of terrorism. Let us go back to the first week, where we discussed the definition and the essence of terrorism. Although there is no universally accepted definition of the phenomenon, it is generally regarded as an instrument of certain actors to achieve political goals, by spreading fear and anxiety through violent acts, and these acts are parts of practice and are not a goal in itself. We quoted Brian Jenkins saying that terrorists like to see a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead. Well, this means that audiences are very important and that their reactions to a terrorism related incidence are what matters. Terrorism is about impact. It's about how you and I react to a bomb attack, a hostage-taking, or shooting spree, which depends on media coverage, statements by politicians, official responses, and many other factors. Well, after the attacks on the US on September the 11th, 2001, in many countries there has been a drastic increase in investments in counterterrorism. Intelligence and law enforcement agencies were given additional means and sometimes additional powers and rights. And the same holds for many governmental actors that play a role in dealing with violent radicalization and terrorism. Also, many new agencies were established. Most noticeable are the counterterrorism coordinators and the fusion centers, that were designed to promote information-sharing at the national or local level between the various relevant counterterrorism actors. Especially in the first five-years of the 9/11, these investments and measures were very ad-hoc, including many immediate responses to concrete incidence. For good reasons the emphasis was on preventing terrorist attacks, in particular, a second attack of the magnitude of the one on 9/11. Well, fortunately, Al-Qaeda, or other terrorist networks, did not manage to repeat an attack on that scale. In some regions and countries, terrorism proved very deadly, nonetheless. The most lethal or spectacular attacks received worldwide attention. Think of the ones in Bali, The Bali bombings, or the attacks in Madrid, the Beslan school tragedy in Russia, the Mumbai attacks, the attacks in Paris, and too many deadly attacks in Iraq, Syria, Somalia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Because of the dramatic images, the high number of victims and the fact that among them were people from many different nationalities, these attacks increased fear of terrorism, not only in the countries where these acts occurred, but also in many other parts of the world. As a result, worries over terrorist attacks and high levels of fear are not only present in those parts of the world that have been hit the hardest. Also in the west, and many other regions, where the number of attacks has been relatively low, the impact of terrorism has been very high. The possibility for terrorists to spread fear around the world, partly irrespective of the location of the attack, raises a fundamental question about the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures. We know for sure that counterterrorism measures have contributed to preventing terrorist attacks, for instance, if we look at the number of convictions for terrorism, or if we look at the number of foiled plots. But how successful is counterterrorism, really if we are still confronted with relatively high levels of fear. If we look at fear and attention, the terrorists often get what they want. In Week 1, we provided the example of the Netherlands, where a single terrorist attack that killed a filmmaker, Theo Van Gogh, was followed by extremely high levels of fear of terrorism. How to limit this specific part of the impacts of terrorism? Well, fear features prominently in many definitions of terrorism. But what is fear, and how does it work? Scholars from many different disciplines have struggled to find answers to these fundamental questions. The difficulty lies amongst others in effect that fear pertains to diffuse range of situations and behaviors. It ranges from an individual, psychological state of mind or a social cultural sentiment in society, to political claims and rhetoric. In relation to the phenomenon of terrorism, Bakker and De Graaf understand fear as 'a sentiment of anxiety caused by the perception or presence of danger'. It should be stressed that fear in itself should not be considered merely as a negative reaction to threats and attacks. Fear of danger is a very natural and useful emotion. For instance, if you see a tiger, would you better be afraid and run or hide? Bakker and De Graaf say that fear is a survival mechanism. Fear of terrorism can encourage people to take the necessary precautions and actions. However, much depends on the level of or the reasons for fear. Well, if fear of terrorism is not proportionate to the actual threat, it can have many unnecessary and unwanted consequences. As observed by Frank Furedi and several other scholars, fear of terrorism can cause a shift towards dogmatic reasoning, which is characterized by 'us versus them' thinking, by stereotyping and discrimination. It can also lead to a lack of nuance contributing to harsh system defending reactions that sometimes do more harm than they do good. In particular, fear-related to terrorist attacks by groups and networks, that's claimed to do so in the name of Islam, have provoked many of the above-mentioned reactions. Well, Brigitte Nacos and Oscar Torres-Reyna demonstrated that the media's portrayal of Muslims and the religion grew more negative, unfair, and stereotypical into two years after the attacks on the US on 9/11. Thus, terrorist attacks do not only contribute to fear in society at the time of the incident, but may also succeed in changing public attitudes for a longer period of time. A major negative consequence of fear of terrorism is that it can make societies more vulnerable to emotional, political, and administrative overreactions. Fear may lead to preference for action oriented leaders, with simple and sensational explanations for terrorism, and who call for immediate action. Encouraged by sensational media representation, the reflex of these leaders to terrorist incidents or cue threats is often one of a strong focus on immediate security measures and repressive actions towards perceived enemies. Immediately after the attack, the public is likely to support, or at least understand drastic policy responses. Although understandable, it can lead to sub-optimal policies into overreactions in terms of false allegations, waves of arrest, a specific legal or bureaucratic measures against members of suspected groups. And such reactions in turn, could lead to increased polarization, and even violent radicalization. In this video, we discussed the negative consequences of fear of terrorism, and we showed that despite the many counterterrorism measures, terrorists do manage to create fear and attract attention. Fear has impacted CT policies in a negative way, focusing on repressive and immediate security measures and overreactions, which can lead to polarization and even to radicalization. In the next video, we further elaborate on the impact of fear and on the concept of resilience.
